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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Social Health Insurance for the Poor: 
Targeting and Impact of Indonesia’s Askeskin Program 
 
Robert Sparrow,* Asep Suryahadi,** and Wenefrida Widyanti** 
* The International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam & IZA 
** The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta 
 
 
 
A first step towards meeting Indonesia’s ambition for universal health insurance was made in 
2005 with the introduction of the Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin) program, a 
subsidized social health insurance for the poor and the informal sector. This scheme covered 
basic healthcare in public health clinics and hospital inpatient care. In this paper we investigate 
targeting and impact of the Askeskin program using household panel data. We find that the 
program is indeed targeted to the poor and those most vulnerable to catastrophic out-of-
pocket health payments. The public health insurance improves access to healthcare in that it 
increases utilization of outpatient healthcare among the poor, while out-of-pocket spending 
seems to have increased for Askeskin insured in urban areas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Indonesian government has recently revealed its ambition for universal health insurance 
by 2014 (Antara News, 2009). A first step towards meeting this ambition had already been 
made with comprehensive public health sector reforms in 2005, as social health insurance was 
expanded to the informal sector and the poor. This nationwide social health insurance for the 
poor (Askeskin) is intended to complement social health insurance schemes for public and 
formal private sector employees. But whereas the formal sector schemes are based on 
mandatory earnings-related contributions, the premiums for Askeskin were fully subsidized by 
a government health fund. 
 
Although the public health sector had been heavily subsidized, with targeted price subsidies to the 
poor since the economic crisis of 1998 (e.g., Pradhan, Sadaah, and Sparrow, 2007), healthcare 
utilization and public spending in Indonesia falls behind its Southeast Asian neighbors, while 
inequality in healthcare utilization in the country is relatively high (O’Donnell et al., 2007). This 
inequality is of particular concern in light of Indonesia’s adoption of fiscal and (partly) political 
decentralization in 2001, under which regime public service delivery is now largely dominated by 
kabupaten (district) administrations. As a result, a large variation in kabupaten public revenue implies 
a larger variation in public spending (Kruse, Pradhan, and Sparrow, 2009). 
 
The combination of low utilization rates and high inequality may explain the observed 
patterns in private health spending. Out-of-pocket (OOP) health payments in Indonesia are 
relatively low compared to those in other Asian countries, as they account for 1.83% of the 
total household spending on average. However, this apparent low propensity to spend is 
accompanied by a high variation across the population, with the nonpoor allocating a larger 
share of their budget on OOP spending (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). 
 
The key objective of Askeskin was to improve access to healthcare and provide financial 
protection against health shocks and illnesses for poor households that lack access to formal 
insurance. With limited insurance coverage, the cost of required healthcare can have implications 
for both transient poverty and long-term poverty traps if households are resource and credit 
constrained. For example, if health payments are financed out of current income, but smoothing 
is imperfect, this may lead to increased transient poverty. On the other hand, if OOP payments 
cannot be completely financed through current income, households may resort to traditional 
coping strategies, such as depletion of assets and buffer stocks, or utilize social networks and 
incur debt (e.g., De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Flores et al., 2008). Such strategies can have long-
term negative effects for the households’ income generating capacity and their ability to cope 
with future shocks. A third possibility would be to forgo treatment altogether, which may have 
long-term consequences through reduced health and depreciation of human capital. 
 
Previous studies for Indonesia have shown that with limited access to credit markets, 
households employ alternative coping mechanisms (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Bazzi, 2008). 
However, while small idiosyncratic shocks seem insurable, full insurance is often not feasible 
(Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti, 2005). Moreover, when households are faced with 
covariate shocks and chronic illnesses, coping mechanisms are ineffective and informal 
insurance fails (e.g., Gertler and Gruber, 2002).  
 
In general, the empirical literature suggests that health insurance can be effective in increasing 
utilization and reducing OOP health spending, although the evidence is sometimes mixed. For 
example, Wagstaff and Pradhan (2006) find that the introduction of social health insurance in 
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Vietnam during the 1990s has decreased OOP and catastrophic health spending, while 
increasing utilization and improving health outcomes. They argue that by reducing financial 
risk, households had to rely less on coping mechanisms such as savings. On the other hand, 
Wagstaff (forthcoming) finds no impact of Vietnam’s recent healthcare fund for the poor on 
utilization, although it does seem to have reduced OOP health spending. For rural China, 
Wagstaff et al. (2009) find positive effects of a voluntary health insurance scheme on the use 
of health services between 2003 and 2005, but find no effect on OOP. Moreover, Wagstaff 
and Lindelow (2008) show that, in urban China, health insurance has in fact increased OOP 
and catastrophic payments, which they attribute to a combination of increased utilization and 
behavioral responses by healthcare providers. 
 
Studies in Latin America find evidence of decreased OOP health payments and catastrophic 
healthcare spending in Mexico due to the Seguro Popular health insurance for the poor 
(Galárraga et al., 2008), and increased healthcare utilization in Colombia due to subsidized 
health insurance for the poor (Trujillo, Portillo, and Vernon, 2005; Giedion, 2007) and 
mandatory contributory based health insurance for the nonpoor (Giedion, Alfonso, and Diaz, 
2007). For Indonesia, Hidayat et al. (2004) find a positive effect of mandatory formal sector 
health insurance on the utilization of outpatient care in the 1990s. Pradhan, Saadah, and 
Sparrow (2007) find that the targeted user fee waivers helped protect access to healthcare for 
the poor during the Indonesia’s economic crisis in 1999. 
 
In this paper, we will investigate the implications of Askeskin for access to healthcare and 
associated financial risk for the poor. We will first analyze targeting of Askeskin in terms of 
reaching those most in need of financial protection. We define need by the level of expected 
required health spending of households, given a demographic profile and health status. We 
then proceed with estimating the impact of Askeskin on outpatient healthcare utilization and 
OOP health payments. The analysis is based on a household panel (Susenas) of 8,582 
households conducted in 2005 and 2006. The first wave of the survey was conducted just 
before the start of Askeskin, hence providing a baseline. Identification of treatment effects 
relies on a difference-in-difference approach combined with propensity score matching. 
 
We find that the program is indeed targeted on the poor and those most vulnerable to 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments. Askesin has improved access to healthcare in that 
it increases utilization of public outpatient care. We do not find evidence of substitution 
effects from private to public care, while there does seem to be a positive impact on OOP 
payments in urban areas. 
 
The next section describes the data and methods used for the analysis. Section 3 sets the 
context and describes the Askeskin program. Section 4 presents the results, while section 5 
concludes. 
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II. DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
2.1 Data 
 
This analysis draws on a national socioeconomic survey (Susenas), conducted for a panel of 
households in 2005 and 2006 by the Statistics Indonesia (BPS). The 2005 wave of the panel 
includes 10,575 households that were subsequently revisited in 2006, yielding a balanced panel 
of 8,582 households. The surveys were conducted around February. With the introduction of 
Askeskin in the second half of 2005, the Susenas data provides a baseline survey in 2005 and a 
post-intervention survey in 2006. 
 
The survey collects information on the socioeconomic status of households, self-reported 
morbidity, healthcare utilization, and participation in public and private health insurance 
schemes and other social programs. The survey also includes a detailed expenditure module, 
for both food and nonfood items. For this analysis, we use all reported health expenditures 
(excluding health insurance premiums) as measure for OOP payments for healthcare. We 
restrict the analysis of utilization to outpatient care, as the reported frequency of inpatient care 
is too low for a robust empirical analysis, in particular for the poorest quartile of the sample. 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are provided in Table 1. The final columns show 
the characteristics of the households in 2005 that were lost in constructing the balanced panel. 
Although the rate of attrition is sizable, there seem to be no systematic differences between 
the subsamples. The households that were dropped in 2006 have slightly higher income and 
education but are almost identical in healthcare utilization. 
 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.1 Targeting of Askeskin to the Poor and Those in Need of Financial Protection 
 
To investigate the targeting of Askeskin, we look at how Askeskin coverage has been allocated 
to the poor and to those households that are expected to require a relatively high expected 
health spending budget share in order to meet their healthcare needs. 
 
For obvious reasons, the variation in OOP health spending may not reflect any difference in 
exposure to adverse health shocks; rather, it is likely to reflect a combination of healthcare 
needs and affordability. Therefore, we will look at the potential exposure to idiosyncratic 
health spending events in terms of the expected OOP payments one would require in order to 
obtain some reference level of healthcare. Pradhan and Prescott (2002) propose a method to 
derive the distribution of expected required health spending from the observed distribution, 
given a demographic profile of households. This distribution lets spending vary by age and 
gender, standardized at some level of per capita general spending. That is, this approach 
assumes that required healthcare is determined by the demographic characteristics of 
households and is not related to the level of income. However, if health status varied by 
income, and if health status were ignored, the derived distribution of health spending needs 
would be misleading. We therefore include a variable indicating that a household member has 
experienced an illness period that disrupted work or school in the month prior to the survey. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Susenas Household Panel 2005–2006, Balanced Panel and Attrition 
 Balanced Household Panel Attrition 
 2005 2006 2005 
 Mean Stand. dev. Mean Stand. dev. Mean Stand. dev. 
Per capita expenditure (IDR) 259,168 230,920 285,947 241,692 294,079 226,354 
Per capita health expenditure (IDR) 5,601 21,344 6,105 47,983 5,607 14,988 
Age 28.28 19.43 28.92 19.78 27.11 18.51 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Household size 4.77 1.79 4.75 1.80 4.64 1.84 
Female head of household 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 
No education 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 
Primary school education 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 
Junior high school education 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 
Senior high school education 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 
Higher education 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
Illness in last month disrupting work/schooling 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 
Number of outpatient visits in last month 0.19 0.76 0.15 0.75 0.19 0.91 
Access to Askeskin   0.12 0.32   
Participates in Askes 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 
Participates in Jamsostek 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 
Number of individuals 34,825  34,525  7,693  
Number of households 8,582  8,582  1,993  
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Using a tobit specification, we regress actual (pre-Askeskin) per capita household OOP 
spending in 2005 on household size and composition, per capita household expenditure, the 
disruptive illness indicator, and a set of urban/rural-province interaction terms. The interaction 
terms capture regional differences in price and supply of healthcare. The tobit coefficients are 
then used to predict OOP health spending per capita for households in 2005 and 2006, with 
household expenditure fixed at the 90th percentile and the location in Jakarta. That is, 
 ( )Jakarta,,,| 90 === LqPCEHDOOPEOOP hhRh  (1) 
 
which we interpret as the expected required OOP health spending for a household, given its 
demographic profile (D) and health status (H), but with the level of wealth (PCE) of the 90th 
per capita expenditure percentile and facing healthcare supply similar to that found in Jakarta 
(L). The choice of expenditure reference point is arbitrary. We choose the 90th percentile as 
we assume that this is the level of wealth at which (most) healthcare needs can be met. The 
predicted OOP spending can therefore not be interpreted independently, but is merely used as 
a relative measure. The 2006 predictions are adjusted for inflation using the observed changes 
in median per capita household spending from 2005 to 2006. 
 
2.2.2 Impact of Askeskin on Healthcare Utilization and Spending 
 
We investigate the impact of Askeskin on access to healthcare, in terms of healthcare 
utilization and OOP health spending shares. A key empirical problem that hampers the impact 
analysis of health insurance is the simultaneous nature of insurance uptake and demand for 
healthcare. Enrollment into Askeskin is not random, but determined by targeting and 
individual compliance to initial assignment. It is therefore not straightforward to discern causal 
effects from the correlation between health insurance coverage on healthcare utilization. 
 
To identify the impact of Askeskin, we exploit the panel structure of the data and the fact that 
2005 provides us as a baseline, by combining a difference-in-difference approach with 
propensity score matching. As the outcome variables, we use the number of outpatient visits 
and budget share of OOP health spending in the last month. We differentiate between overall 
utilization and that of the main public healthcare providers (public health centers and hospitals). 
 
First, we take a nonparametric difference-in-difference approach 
 ( ) ( )0|1| 2005,2006,2005,2006, =−−=−= AyyEAyyE hhhhDDβ  (2) 
 
as well as a parametric analogue, by estimating a difference regression and control for a set of 
time variant covariates 
 
htrththtDDht XAy εδγβ Δ++Δ+Δ=Δ '  (3) 
 
The treatment variable Aht = 1 if household h enjoys Askeskin insurance coverage in year t, 
and Aht = 0 otherwise. Time invariant factors such as the main selection criteria, latent health 
status, healthcare preferences, and static socioeconomic characteristics are eliminated in this 
setup. Difference regression (3) also includes control variables (Xht) for changes in household 
size and composition, education of the head of households, participation in other insurance 
schemes, and housing conditions (house ownership, floor area, and access to piped water). We 
control for aggregate unobserved shocks, which we allow to vary by province (δrt), while 
idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be randomly distributed. 
 
Finally, we combine the nonparametric difference-in-difference approach with propensity 
score matching 
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( ) ( )( )1,0|1,1| 2005,2006,2005,2006, ==−−==−= hhhhhhhhhPSM SAyyWESAyyEβ  (4) 
 
where Wh = W(P(Xh)) is a weight based on the estimated propensity score P(Xh) and the 
matching method, and S reflects the range of common support. The advantage of propensity 
score matching over difference-in-difference is that we can control for observed 
characteristics that determine Askeskin enrollment, without imposing a functional form on y. 
In addition, the matching procedure restricts the analysis to the range of common support. 
The propensity score is predicted based on probit estimates of the probability that a 
household enjoys Askeskin coverage in 2006 as a function of the 2005 values of the control 
variables used in equation (3) and per capita quartile dummy variables. We then use two 
different matching estimators, by (i) matching treated households to the five nearest 
neighbors, and (ii) matching based on an Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.06 bandwidth. 
 
All three approaches rest on the identifying assumption that unobserved shocks do not drive 
healthcare utilization nor do they affect targeting of Askeskin. There are, however, two potential 
confounding time variant unobservables that we need to consider. The first is an unobserved 
health shock. This would affect the demand for health services and the likelihood of receiving 
Askeskin coverage, as a rapid assessment by Bachtiar, Wibisana, and Pujiyanto (2006) suggests 
that Askeskin was sometimes allocated based on acute need. Ignoring changes in health status 
could therefore lead us to overestimate the impact of Askeskin. To control for health shocks, we 
include the disruptive illness variable in the difference regressions. In the propensity score 
function, this is the only variable for which we include both the 2005 and 2006 variables in order 
to capture the health shock. We acknowledge that such a subjective health measure is prone to 
reporting bias and unobserved heterogeneity in perceptions of health status. Nevertheless, 
including the self-reported illness variable should give us some indication of the extent of the 
bias due to unobserved health shocks. Moreover, in such a short time span, latent perceptions of 
health status are unlikely to change due to unobserved factors other than a health shock; 
therefore, household fixed effects should capture any effects from reporting bias. 
 
Alternative targeted poverty programs are another form of shock that could lead to 
confounding effects of the different schemes, for example, if these schemes share local 
targeting mechanisms. In case of Askeskin, a potential confounding factor is the launch of a 
nationwide unconditional cash transfer program (BLT) in the second half of 2005, targeted 
specifically to the poor. If Askeskin is targeted to BLT recipients, then the impact estimates 
could be picking up the income effect from the BLT scheme. The Susenas survey collects 
information on BLT receipts by households, reporting 26.3% coverage among households. 
The correlation coefficient of Askeskin and BLT coverage (at household level and applying 
household sampling weights) is 0.344. Among households with at least one member 
participating in Askeskin, 67.9% received BLT as well, while 30.3% of BLT households 
benefited from Askeskin health insurance coverage. Hence, there is some nontrivial overlap 
between both programs. We investigate potential confounding BLT effects by looking at the 
sensitivity to including a BLT treatment dummy variable in the regressions. 
 
Finally, there may be intrahousehold spillover effects, as providing one household member 
with Askeskin coverage will relax the budget constraint for the entire household; for 
example, when Askeskin coverage is assigned to the household member most prone to 
catastrophic health events or with a history of health problems. Therefore, we estimate the 
impact with the household as the unit of analysis by taking the average utilization by the 
household members as the outcome variable and a binary treatment variable indicating the 
presence of a household member with Askeskin coverage. 
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III. HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION 
IN INDONESIA 
 
 
3.1 Social Insurance in Indonesia 
 
At the time Askeskin was to be introduced, around 10% of the Indonesian population was 
covered by social health insurance (ILO, 2008), through mandatory health insurance for civil 
servants (Askes), the police and military (Asabri) and the formal private sector (Jamsostek). 
For all the three schemes, the premiums for beneficiaries are related to earnings, but not to 
the benefits. The Askes and Asabri schemes are similar in design and benefit package, where 
the beneficiary contributions are matched by the government. Premiums for Jamsostek are 
paid by the employers, and enrollment is mandatory for firms in the formal private sector with 
at least ten workers or a payroll of at least Rp1 million per month. However, firms may opt 
out of Jamsostek in favor of private health insurance if this yields higher insurance benefits. 
Private health insurance and other schemes covered around 3% of the population and 
community-based insurance less than 1% (Rokx et al., 2009). 
 
Formal insurance coverage remained limited as the informal sector, making up more than 60% 
of the labor force, was excluded from social health insurance. Instead, the poor could obtain 
user fee waivers for public healthcare through the Social Safety Net (JPS) health cards. 
Reimbursement for public healthcare providers was not tied to services delivered to health card 
holders, but based on the estimated number of eligible households in the catchment area. In 
2005, the health card program discontinued, as the Askeskin insurance scheme was introduced. 
 
 
3.2 Askeskin 
 
The Askeskin health insurance program was introduced with the objective to expand social 
security to the informal sector, aiming at a target population of 60 million people. The 
insurance includes basic outpatient care, third class hospital care in grade A–D hospitals, an 
obstetric service package, mobile health services and special services for remote areas and 
islands, immunization programs, and medicines. Hospitals could submit claims for services 
delivered to Askeskin beneficiaries based on fee for service, while primary health centers were 
compensated on capitation basis. Although it was initially the intention to cover private health 
services as well, only a third of the private healthcare providers accept Askeskin insurance. 
Resources and risk were pooled at the kabupaten level, with monthly premiums of Rp5,000 per 
month fully subsidized by the government. The total annual budget for 2005 was set at Rp3.9 
trillion (approximately US$400 million) initially financed through the energy subsidy 
reductions (Aran, 2007; ILO, 2008). 
 
Targeting of Askeskin beneficiaries was based on a combination of geographic (kabupaten) 
targeting and selection of eligible individuals within the kabupaten. The kabupaten budgets quota 
for Askeskin participants were determined based on kabupaten poverty indicators provided by 
BPS. The kabupaten then identified eligible individuals, using census-based welfare and poverty 
indicators from BPS or the Family Planning Board (BKKBN). However, due to delays in 
rolling out Askeskin coverage in its first year, the JPS health cards and village poverty letters 
(SKTM) could also be used to claim Askeskin benefits (Arifianto et al., 2005; Ministry of 
Health, 2005). 
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Qualitative studies on the implementation of Askeskin highlighted a number of additional 
shortcomings in the first year. Arifianto et al. (2005) report that some individuals declined 
Askeskin insurance. Although the allocation of Askeskin was based on individual coverage, 
the targeting process identified eligible households where each individual household member 
is entitled to receive Askeskin coverage. In practice, however, accepting Askeskin involved 
indirect costs as recipients had to pay for their photographs that would appear on their 
Askeskin insurance cards. Some household therefore opted for partial coverage, with only 
some household members registering for Askeskin. They also find anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that Askeskin financed care is sometimes perceived as being of inferior quality to 
that received by self-paying patients, and that not all services in the Askeskin benefit package 
are actually delivered. Bachtiar, Wibisana, and Pujiyanto (2006) claim that explanation of 
procedures to beneficiaries, administrative procedures, and responsibilities for healthcare 
providers was lacking. They also found that indirect costs are not covered and that travel 
distance still remains a barrier, despite the programs support for mobile health services. This is 
a problem that was also observed hindering impact of the JPS health card (Pradhan, Saadah, 
and Sparrow, 2007; Sparrow, 2008). 
 
 
3.3 Healthcare Utilization and OOP Health Payments in Indonesia: Is 
There a Scope for Public Intervention? 
 
Utilization of outpatient healthcare in 2005 and 2006 is presented in Table 2. The table shows 
the number of outpatient visits in the last month at public and private healthcare providers, by 
per capita expenditure quartile and urban/rural location. 
 
Table 2. Utilization of Outpatient Healthcare (Number of Visits in Last Month) at 
Public and Private Healthcare Providers, Susenas Household Panel 2005–2006 
 All Providers Public Private 
Outpatient Care 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.1655 0.1217 0.0787 0.0654 0.0746 0.0423 
Quartile 2 0.1808 0.1587 0.0764 0.0758 0.0959 0.0657 
Quartile 3 0.1980 0.1605 0.0820 0.0577 0.1043 0.0897 
Quartile 4 (richest) 0.2089 0.1596 0.0671 0.0528 0.1302 0.0992 
Urban 0.1861 0.1422 0.0717 0.0565 0.1022 0.0753 
Rural 0.1861 0.1544 0.0803 0.0696 0.0957 0.0693 
Total 0.1861 0.1486 0.0765 0.0634 0.0986 0.0721 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
 
The general pattern is that utilization of outpatient care increases with the level of welfare. 
About a third of the visits occur at public health centers. The pro-rich pattern is driven by 
differences in private care, which is traditionally highly skewed towards the nonpoor. 
Utilization of public care is more evenly distributed across the expenditure quartiles, 
decreasing slightly for higher levels of expenditures. Overall, we see a decline in outpatient 
care utilization, dropping from 0.19 visits per month in 2005 to 0.15 in 2006. This decline can 
be explained by the fuel subsidy decreases in March and October 2005 and is observed for all 
population groups. 
 
Table 3 shows monthly per capita health spending as share of total per capita spending (panel 
A). Since consumption baskets of the poor typically have higher food shares, the relative 
burden of OOP payments on household budgets may be better reflected by the share of 
nonfood spending (e.g., Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003). This is reported in the last two 
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columns. The table shows expected patterns also observed in previous studies on Indonesia 
(Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). Indonesian households allocate on average about 2% of their 
monthly expenditures to healthcare, with OOP higher payments for the rich and in urban 
areas. In 2006 the share of OOP payments in total spending was 2.4% for the richest quartile 
and 1.4% for the poorest quartile, reflecting differences in affordability of care and the 
propensity to spend between poor and rich. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Actual and Predicted Out-Of-Pocket Health Expenditure 
Budget Shares (%) 
 Share of Total Spending Share of Nonfood Spending 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 
A. Actual     
Quartile 1 (poorest) 1.74 1.42 5.17 4.43 
Quartile 2 1.76 1.81 4.87 4.83 
Quartile 3 2.17 1.93 5.18 4.51 
Quartile 4 (richest) 2.67 2.36 5.04 4.26 
Urban 2.13 1.99 4.62 4.19 
Rural 2.03 1.78 5.41 4.78 
Total 2.07 1.88 5.07 4.51 
B. Predicted     
Quartile 1 (poorest) 11.07 10.97 37.51 38.72 
Quartile 2 6.34 6.27 19.13 19.03 
Quartile 3 4.23 4.11 11.45 10.72 
Quartile 4 (richest) 2.14 2.10 4.82 4.60 
Urban 4.51 4.36 11.66 11.24 
Rural 7.27 7.15 24.07 24.27 
Total 6.07 5.86 18.68 18.26 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: predicted out-of-pocket health expenditures are based on tobit estimates reported in Table A1 of the appendices. 
The tobit linear predictions are truncated at a lower bound of zero, with per capita expenditure fixed at the 90th percentile 
and location in Jakarta. 
 
The predicted OOP payments in 2005 and 2006 to meet healthcare needs are given in panel B 
of Table 3. Unlike the distribution of actual OOP expenditures, the expected OOP 
requirements show a strong pro-poor distribution. In 2006, OOP spending for a household 
from the poorest quartile to obtain a required level of healthcare would constitute about 
11.0% of the total household budget and 38.7% of the nonfood budget on average. For the 
richest quartile, this is 2.1% and 4.6% respectively. Expected required OOP spending relative 
to the total budget is about 50% higher for households in rural villages as compared to urban 
areas. Since the spending regression controls for urban-rural price differences, this difference 
is likely to be due to differences in household composition, with rural households having a 
demographic profile that induces relatively more healthcare needs. 
 
While recognizing the shortcomings of the different measures that we apply here, the overall 
evidence is compelling. The pattern in OOP payments that we observe can be explained on 
the one hand by subsidized public healthcare resulting in relatively low OOP payments and 
catastrophic health spending events compared to other Asian countries, while on the other 
hand the poor are exposed to a higher burden of required healthcare spending relative to their 
budgets, leading to relative underutilization of healthcare, a lower propensity to spend, and a 
higher probability to forgo needed healthcare. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Targeting 
 
Table 4 presents targeting performance of Askeskin, which shows a pro-poor pattern (following 
the 2005 quartile definition). Among the poorest quartile, 21.6% of people enjoy Askeskin 
coverage, which accounts for 51.8% of all Askeskin participants. About 80% of the people 
covered by Askeskin are with the poorest 50% of the population. Nevertheless, this also implies 
some nontrivial leakage to the nonpoor. Askeskin coverage is higher in rural areas (14.6%) than 
in urban areas (8.6%), which translates to a 65.3% rural share in overall Askeskin coverage. 
 
Table 4. Targeting of Askeskin Coverage in 2006 (%) 
 Coverage Share 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 21.55 51.79 
Quartile 2 12.69 27.46 
Quartile 3 7.86 16.11 
Quartile 4 (richest) 2.46 4.63 
Urban 8.64 34.71 
Rural 14.55 65.29 
Male 11.79 50.21 
Female 11.74 49.79 
Total 11.76 100.00 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Quartiles are based on 2005 per capita expenditure. 
 
Askeskin is reasonably successful in targeting individuals that would need relatively high OOP 
health spending as share of the overall household budget to obtain the expected required 
healthcare. Table 5 shows the coverage of Askeskin for different levels of actual OOP budget 
shares and the required equivalent for expected healthcare needs. Askeskin is relatively evenly 
distributed with regard to the actual OOP budget shares, with the highest coverage for the 
fourth OOP quartile (i.e., households with the highest OOP health budget share). Differences 
are more pronounced for health spending as share of nonfood budget. Among the 25% of the 
population faced with the lowest OOP/nonfood budget share, 9.7% has Askeskin coverage, 
while this increases to 14.4% for the 25% of the population faced with the highest shares. The 
gradient becomes even steeper when we compare Askeskin coverage to the distribution of 
OOP budget shares required to obtain expected healthcare needs. Coverage increases from 
5.0% for the least needy to 19.6% for the most needy. 
 
Table 5. Targeting of Askeskin with respect to Distribution of Actual and Predicted 
Out-Of-Pocket Health Expenditures (%) 
 OOP a Predicted OOP b 
 Share of Total Spending  
Share of 
Nonfood 
Spending 
Share of Total 
Spending  
Share of 
Nonfood 
Spending 
Quartile 1 (low OOP share) 11.90 9.71 5.02 4.24 
Quartile 2 10.38 10.71 8.05 8.12 
Quartile 3 11.34 12.39 12.43 11.89 
Quartile 4 (high OOP share) 13.53 14.36 19.60 20.79 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
aQuartiles reflect the distribution of actual out-of-pocket health expenditure budget shares in 2005. 
bQuartiles reflect the distribution of predicted out-of-pocket health expenditure budget shares for 2006, based on estimates 
reported in Table A1 of the appendices, with per capita expenditure fixed at the 90th percentile and location in Jakarta. 
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4.2 Impact of Askeskin 
 
The estimated treatment effects are presented in Table 6, with the results of the difference 
regressions in panel A and the propensity score matching results in panel B. The table reports 
the results for overall utilization, utilization of public and private care separately, and by main 
public healthcare providers (public health centers and hospitals). The tables also show the 
differential impacts by per capita expenditure quartile and urban/rural. The quartiles are based 
on household expenditure in 2005, to ensure that the observed impact heterogeneity is not 
confounded by the impact of Askeskin on household spending.1 
 
The impact variable is having Askeskin coverage in 2006. Due to initial problems with 
disbursing Askeskin insurance cards in the first year of the program, targeted households 
could also claim insurance benefits using a poverty letter issued by their village officials or 
outdated 2005 health cards. Although the potential healthcare benefits provided under these 
schemes in 2005 differ from Askeskin, we do need to control for initial coverage. Failing to do 
so would result in underestimation of the true impact of Askeskin. Note that health card 
coverage in 2005 did not imply automatic Askeskin coverage in 2006, as there is considerable 
variation in participation in both schemes. About half of the households in our balanced panel 
with a health card in 2005 were also participating in Askeskin in 2006 and this group 
constitutes 38% of all Askeskin households. 
 
The difference-in-difference and the matching estimates show similar results, although the 
latter give slightly larger effects. The difference results suggest that Askeskin increased 
outpatient care utilization by 0.048 visits per person per month (vppm), while kernel matching 
yields an impact of 0.059 vppm. The patterns are very similar across methods, with the bulk of 
the impact occurring at rural public health centers and urban public hospitals. The effect for 
rural areas can simply be explained by the fact that public health centers are the dominant 
public healthcare providers available. In urban areas the availability of providers is more varied 
and Askeskin services seem to have been mainly used for relatively expensive healthcare 
services at public hospitals. The increase in OOP payments in urban areas suggests that the 
Askeskin insured had to bear part of the costs of these extra public services. Wagstaf and 
Lindelow (2008) find a similar effect in China and argue that this is due to an increase in more 
high-tech and expensive care, which is typically bulky and indivisible. 
 
Between population groups, the treatment effects vary greatly, as the distribution of impact is 
skewed towards the poor. Askeskin coverage increases utilization of public care for the 
poorest quartile by 0.043 and 0.050 visits, depending on the choice of method, while for the 
richest, there seems to be no impact. We also find no evidence of substitution from private to 
public care. 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 7, showing single difference 
estimates, various difference-in-difference specifications, and alternative propensity score 
matching estimators. Columns (4) and (6) report the estimates for the specification used in 
Table 6. The single difference estimates are twice as large as double difference estimates, 
suggesting that initial selection was partly based on acute need. Once we control for self-
reported illness, the treatment effects for outpatient care reduce further. 
                                                 
1The probit estimates of the propensity score function and the balancing test are not presented here, but are 
reported in Table A3 and Table A4 of the appendices. While the unmatched treated and nontreated samples 
differ strongly, the matched samples are balanced in all the variables included in the propensity score function. 
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Table 6. Impact of Askeskin on Healthcare Utilization and OOP Health Payments, by Population Group 
 Outpatient Healthcare Utilization 
 All Public Private Public Health Center Public Hospital 
OOP Health 
Payments Share 
A. Difference-in-Difference       
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0534* 0.0426** -0.0009 0.0335** 0.0090 0.0027 
Quartile 2 0.0295 0.0544*** 0.0007 0.0479*** 0.0065 0.0024 
Quartile 3 0.0344 0.0260 0.0251 0.0035 0.0225 -0.0008 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0065 0.0647 -0.0625 0.0429 0.0218 0.0029 
Rural 0.0482** 0.0599*** -0.0043 0.0498*** 0.0102 0.0008 
Urban 0.0538 0.0254 0.0199 0.0025 0.0230** 0.0086*** 
Total 0.0484*** 0.0478*** 0.0028 0.0328*** 0.0150** 0.0030* 
B. Propensity score matching       
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0751* 0.0503** 0.0096 0.0450*** 0.0053 0.0020 
Quartile 2 0.0228 0.0454** 0.0027 0.0399* 0.0055 0.0039 
Quartile 3 0.0435 0.0263 0.0255 -0.0067 0.0330*** -0.0006 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0230 0.0465 -0.0745 0.0409 0.0056 -0.0004 
Rural 0.0524** 0.0627*** -0.0057 0.0526*** 0.0101 -0.0001 
Urban 0.1040** 0.0552** 0.0271 0.0137 0.0416*** 0.0091** 
Total 0.0672*** 0.0594*** 0.0054 0.0412*** 0.0183*** 0.0026 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Outcome variables are the average number of outpatient visits per household member in last month, and OOP health payment share of household spending in last month. Other 
covariates in difference equation have been omitted for convenience. Propensity score matching is based on the Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.06 bandwidth. Quartiles are based on 2005 per 
capita expenditure. The number of observations is 17,164 households; with a balanced panel of 8,582 households for 2 years. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis of Askeskin Impact, Household Fixed Effects 
 Single Difference  Difference-in-Difference Propensity Score Matching  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outpatient care 0.0802*** 0.0422** 0.0298* 0.0484*** 0.0371* 0.0672*** 0.0530*** 
 [0.0138] [0.0182] [0.0171] [0.0185] [0.0196] [0.0236] [0.0260] 
Public 0.0714*** 0.0352*** 0.0302*** 0.0478*** 0.0435*** 0.0594*** 0.0573*** 
 [0.0081] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0114] [0.0121] [0.0136] [0.0148] 
Private -0.0030 0.0105 0.0039 0.0028 0.0011 0.0054 -0.0027 
 [0.0082] [0.0112] [0.0106] [0.0115] [0.0121] [0.0130] [0.0141] 
Public health center 0.0704*** 0.0293*** 0.0248*** 0.0328*** 0.0296*** 0.0412*** 0.0415*** 
 [0.0066] [0.0089] [0.0086] [0.0092] [0.0098] [0.0120] [0.0128] 
Public hospital 0.0011 0.0059 0.0055 0.0150** 0.0139* 0.0183*** 0.0157*** 
 [0.0047] [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0066] [0.0071] [0.0063] [0.0073] 
OOP 0.0019 0.0013 0.0011 0.0030* 0.0034* 0.0026 0.0017 
 [0.0012] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0020] 
Specification        
Ill last month No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Other controls a No No No Yes Yes No No 
BLT No No No No Yes No No 
Matching b No No No No No Epanechnikov 
kernel 
5 nearest 
neighbors 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
aFull set of control variables include formal social health insurance coverage (Askes, Jamsostek), 2005 health card, household characteristics (size, composition, gender and education of household 
head, housing characteristics, and water access), and province dummy variables. Detailed specifications for columns (1) to (5) are reported in Table A5 to Table A10 of the appendices. 
bEstimates of the propensity score function are reported in Table A2 of the appendices. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Nevertheless, the difference-in-difference estimates remain sizeable and precise, while the results 
for the full specification and the propensity score estimates are fairly robust. The estimated 
treatment effects also do not seem to be confounded by income effects from BLT.2 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores the impact of the Indonesian Askeskin program, introduced in 2005 to 
provide public health insurance for the poor. We first observed that there is indeed scope for 
public intervention regarding health insurance, as the Indonesian poor tend to underutilize 
healthcare services and have a lower propensity to spend relative to their needs. 
 
Askeskin has been successful in targeting the poor, despite some nontrivial leakage to the 
nonpoor. In addition, Askeskin seems to have been allocated proportionally more to 
individuals that live in households that are expected to require a relatively high OOP 
healthcare budget share in order to meet healthcare needs. 
 
There appears to be a strong impact of Askeskin on the poor, as coverage increases utilization 
of public outpatient care. However, OOP health payments have increased slightly in urban 
areas, which is most likely due to an increase of relatively more expensive hospital care for 
which the costs have not been fully covered by the Askeskin insurance. The results are robust 
to choice of method. 
 
However, as lessons learned for achieving the objective of universal coverage, these results 
need to be treated cautiously as there are some qualifications of this study that need to be 
taken into consideration. First, this analysis presents short-term impact only. In 2006 the 
targeting of Askeskin was still expanding. Initial implementation experienced various problems 
as well as confusion on the rights and obligation of patients and providers. Second, the 
sustainability of this program is still in question. For universal coverage, it is critical to set the 
right balance between insurance premiums and government subsidy. Third, this study does 
not look into the supply and quality of public healthcare. The issues of inferior quality and 
discrimination of services for Askeskin recipients were often raised as reasons for declining 
Askeskin. Finally, scaling up social health insurance needs to take into account possible 
behavioural responses by providers and adequate provider payment systems so as to avoid a 
backlash in the provision of public healthcare. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2Note that we drop the BLT variable from the final specification as it includes some missing observations, 
reducing the sample size from 8,582 to 8,448 households in the balanced panel. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Table A1. Health Expenditure Regression, 2005, Tobit Estimates 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Per capita expenditure 0.0118*** [0.0022] 
Household size 2,305.6282*** [611.9923] 
Household size squared -166.8175*** [58.3574] 
Illness in last month 9,273.7272*** [947.8131] 
Household composition (ref: share of 
males aged 18–60) 
  
Share of females aged <6 -4,377.1664 [4,441.6067] 
Share of males aged <6 -20,062.8959*** [4,116.5269] 
Share of females aged 6–17 -26,741.9618*** [3,135.0346] 
Share of males aged 6–17 -3,859.8069 [3,039.8095] 
Share of females aged 18–60 -5,473.1586** [2,581.8703] 
Share of females aged >60 -821.2848 [2,587.3383] 
Share of males aged >60 7,481.7587*** [2,693.2960] 
Household composition × per capita 
expenditure interaction effects 
  
i: Share of females aged <6 0.0256* [0.0135] 
i: Share of males aged <6 0.0963*** [0.0125] 
i: Share of females aged 6–17 0.0932*** [0.0085] 
i: Share of males aged 6–17 0.0000 [0.0085] 
i: Share of females aged 18–60 0.0170*** [0.0041] 
i: Share of females aged >60 0.0207*** [0.0052] 
i: Share of males aged >60 -0.0003 [0.0051] 
Rural area -2,800.8151 [6,889.1939] 
Constant -8,280.1539 [6,351.5917] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0061  
Observations 8,582  
Health expenditure >0 8,001  
Health expenditure =0 581  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: including rural × province interaction terms. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A2. Propensity Score Function, Probability of Askeskin Coverage (Probit) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Illness in last month (2005) 0.0237 [0.0689] 
Illness in last month (2006) 0.4700*** [0.0715] 
Health card 1.0457*** [0.0467] 
Askes -0.5433*** [0.1218] 
Jamsostek -0.0668 [0.1104] 
Household size 0.0070 [0.0141] 
Household composition (ref: share of males aged 18-60)   
Share of females aged <6 -0.3127 [0.2161] 
Share of males aged <6 0.3954** [0.2000] 
Share of females aged 6–17 0.0444 [0.1646] 
Share of males aged 6–17 0.2965* [0.1575] 
Share of females aged 18–60 0.0055 [0.1633] 
Share of males aged >60 0.2160 [0.1551] 
Share of females aged >60 0.2191 [0.1625] 
Female head of household 0.0033 [0.0732] 
Education head of household (ref: no education)   
Primary school -0.1118** [0.0452] 
Junior high school -0.0696 [0.0629] 
Senior high school -0.1203* [0.0685] 
Higher education -0.7448*** [0.2111] 
Per capita consumption quartile (ref: quartile 1)   
Quartile 2 -0.2341*** [0.0471] 
Quartile 3 -0.3685*** [0.0538] 
Quartile 4 -0.6715*** [0.0740] 
Owns house 0.0817 [0.0591] 
Floor area (m2) -0.0015*** [0.0004] 
Piped water access 0.1217** [0.0547] 
Own water access -0.1649*** [0.0390] 
Constant -0.8656*** [0.1566] 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1954 
Observations 8,582 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: All control variables refer to 2005, except for self-reported illnesses in 2006. Province dummy variables are also 
included. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A3. Balancing Properties of the Matched Samples 
 Unmatched Matched   
 T C T C Diff. t-stat 
Illness in last month (2005) 0.2343 0.1806 0.2343 0.2338 0.0005 0.04 
Illness in last month (2006) 0.2169 0.1454 0.2169 0.2083 0.0086 0.79 
Health card 0.3809 0.0709 0.3809 0.3750 0.0059 0.32 
Askes 0.0115 0.1007 0.0115 0.0154 -0.0039 -0.89 
Jamsostek 0.0180 0.0612 0.0180 0.0193 -0.0013 -0.25 
Household size 4.1210 4.0457 4.1210 4.0963 0.0247 0.35 
Household composition       
Share of females age <6 0.0418 0.0492 0.0418 0.0421 -0.0003 -0.09 
Share of males age <6 0.0593 0.0513 0.0593 0.0587 0.0006 0.15 
Share of females age 6–17 0.1032 0.1050 0.1032 0.1011 0.0022 0.39 
Share of males age 6–17 0.1218 0.1067 0.1218 0.1199 0.0019 0.32 
Share of females age 18–60 0.2774 0.3053 0.2774 0.2764 0.0010 0.15 
Share of males age >60 0.0586 0.0409 0.0586 0.0597 -0.0011 -0.20 
Share of females age >60 0.0891 0.0535 0.0891 0.0919 -0.0028 -0.34 
Female head of household 0.1433 0.1155 0.1433 0.1469 -0.0036 -0.27 
Education of head of household       
Primary school 0.3348 0.3246 0.3348 0.3308 0.0040 0.22 
Junior high school 0.1145 0.1340 0.1145 0.1177 -0.0032 -0.26 
Senior high school 0.0929 0.1905 0.0929 0.0897 0.0032 0.30 
Higher education 0.0029 0.0605 0.0029 0.0063 -0.0035 -1.34 
Per capita consumption quartile       
Quartile 2 0.2786 0.2430 0.2786 0.2781 0.0005 0.03 
Quartile 3 0.1865 0.2616 0.1865 0.1887 -0.0023 -0.15 
Quartile 4 0.0655 0.2673 0.0655 0.0720 -0.0065 -0.68 
Owns house 0.8927 0.8421 0.8927 0.8934 -0.0007 -0.06 
Floor area (m2) 59.34 70.64 59.34 61.39 -2.05 -1.24 
Piped water access 0.1433 0.2106 0.1433 0.1389 0.0044 0.33 
Own water access 0.4032 0.5578 0.4032 0.4010 0.0021 0.11 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: All province dummy variables are also balanced after matching. The matched samples are based on the 
Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.06 bandwidth. 
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Table A4. Propensity-Score-Based Impact Estimates of Askeskin on Health Care Utilization and OOP Health Payments, by Population 
Group 
 Outpatient Healthcare Utilization 
 All Public Private Public Health Center Public Hospital 
OOP Health Payments 
Share 
A. Epanechnikov kernel       
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0751* 0.0503** 0.0096 0.0450*** 0.0053 0.0020 
Quartile 2 0.0228 0.0454** 0.0027 0.0399* 0.0055 0.0039 
Quartile 3 0.0435 0.0263 0.0255 -0.0067 0.0330*** -0.0006 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0230 0.0465 -0.0745 0.0409 0.0056 -0.0004 
Rural 0.0524** 0.0627*** -0.0057 0.0526*** 0.0101 -0.0001 
Urban 0.1040** 0.0552** 0.0271 0.0137 0.0416*** 0.0091** 
Total 0.0672*** 0.0594*** 0.0054 0.0412*** 0.0183*** 0.0026 
       
B. 5 nearest neighbors       
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0679* 0.0481** 0.0054 0.0456** 0.0024 0.0009 
Quartile 2 0.0368 0.0412* 0.0185 0.0408* 0.0004 0.0057* 
Quartile 3 0.0361 0.0503 -0.0026 -0.0150 0.0652*** -0.0007 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0628 0.0663 -0.0924 0.0649 0.0014 -0.0030 
Rural 0.0330 0.0593*** -0.0195 0.0487*** 0.0105 -0.0011 
Urban 0.0907 0.0469* 0.0358 0.0153 0.0316** 0.0072* 
Total 0.0530** 0.0573*** -0.0027 0.0415*** 0.0157** 0.0017 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Outcome variables are the average number of outpatient visits per household member in last month and OOP expenditure share of household spending in last month. Other covariates in 
difference equation have been omitted for convenience. Quartiles are based on 2005 per capita expenditure. The number of observations is 17,164 households; with a balanced panel of 8,582 
households for 2 years. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A5. Impact of Askeskin Coverage on Average Outpatient Healthcare 
Utilization per Household Member 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin 0.0802*** 0.0422** 0.0298* 0.0484*** 0.0371* 
 [0.0138] [0.0182] [0.0171] [0.0185] [0.0196] 
Health card    0.0664*** 0.0721*** 
    [0.0210] [0.0213] 
Askes    0.0437 0.0381 
    [0.0312] [0.0316] 
Jamsostek    -0.0011 -0.0025 
    [0.0294] [0.0298] 
BLT recipient household     0.0383** 
     [0.0157] 
Illness in last month   0.6972*** 0.6943*** 0.6918*** 
   [0.0203] [0.0204] [0.0205] 
Household size    -0.0019 -0.0019 
    [0.0065] [0.0066] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60)      
Share of females aged <6    0.0221 0.0241 
    [0.0969] [0.0981] 
Share of males aged <6    -0.1167 -0.1226 
    [0.0912] [0.0922] 
Share of females aged 6–17    -0.0700 -0.0752 
    [0.0778] [0.0786] 
Share of males aged 6–17    0.0307 0.0263 
    [0.0725] [0.0736] 
Share of females aged 18–60    0.0043 -0.0029 
    [0.0677] [0.0686] 
Share of males aged >60    -0.0081 -0.0259 
    [0.0736] [0.0745] 
Share of females aged >60    0.0853 0.0799 
    [0.0815] [0.0822] 
Female head of household    0.0191 0.0091 
    [0.0537] [0.0544] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education)      
No education    -0.0116 -0.0240 
    [0.0589] [0.0600] 
Primary school    -0.0150 -0.0273 
    [0.0575] [0.0586] 
Junior high school    -0.0581 -0.0704 
    [0.0566] [0.0578] 
Senior high school    -0.0181 -0.0329 
    [0.0520] [0.0531] 
Owns house    -0.0475** -0.0466** 
    [0.0230] [0.0233] 
Floor area (m2)    -0.0000 -0.0000 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Piped water access    0.0178 0.0205 
    [0.0217] [0.0219] 
Own water access    -0.0124 -0.0124 
    [0.0116] [0.0117] 
Constant    0.0043 -0.0062 
    [0.0305] [0.0313] 
R-squared (within) 0.0008 0.0006 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Observations 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,448 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the number of outpatient visits in last month. All specifications 
include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A6. Impact of Askeskin Insurance Coverage on Average Utilization of Public 
Outpatient Healthcare per Household Member 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin 0.0714*** 0.0352*** 0.0302*** 0.0478*** 0.0435*** 
 [0.0081] [0.0108] [0.0105] [0.0114] [0.0121] 
Health card    0.0586*** 0.0599*** 
    [0.0129] [0.0131] 
Askes    0.0044 0.0018 
    [0.0192] [0.0195] 
Jamsostek    -0.0098 -0.0109 
    [0.0181] [0.0184] 
BLT recipient household     0.0145 
     [0.0097] 
Illness in last month   0.2799*** 0.2772*** 0.2770*** 
   [0.0125] [0.0126] [0.0127] 
Household size    -0.0024 -0.0024 
    [0.0040] [0.0041] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60) 
     
Share of females aged <6    0.0015 -0.0012 
    [0.0596] [0.0606] 
Share of males aged <6    -0.0636 -0.0660 
    [0.0561] [0.0570] 
Share of females aged 6–17    -0.0867* -0.0885* 
    [0.0479] [0.0486] 
Share of males aged 6–17    -0.0328 -0.0330 
    [0.0446] [0.0455] 
Share of females aged 18–60    -0.0878** -0.0861** 
    [0.0416] [0.0424] 
Share of males aged >60    0.0744* 0.0707 
    [0.0453] [0.0461] 
Share of females aged >60    -0.1097** -0.1106** 
    [0.0501] [0.0508] 
Female head of household    0.0244 0.0238 
    [0.0330] [0.0336] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education) 
     
No education    -0.0110 -0.0174 
    [0.0362] [0.0371] 
Primary school    -0.0065 -0.0142 
    [0.0353] [0.0362] 
Junior high school    -0.0205 -0.0277 
    [0.0348] [0.0357] 
Senior high school    0.0135 0.0059 
    [0.0320] [0.0328] 
Owns house    0.0042 0.0044 
    [0.0142] [0.0144] 
Floor area (m2)    -0.0000 -0.0000 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Piped water access    0.0016 0.0026 
    [0.0133] [0.0135] 
Own water access    -0.0079 -0.0072 
    [0.0071] [0.0073] 
Constant    0.0091 0.0066 
    [0.0187] [0.0193] 
R-squared (within) 0.01 0.001 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Observations 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,448 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the number of outpatient visits at a public provider in last month. 
All specifications include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A7. Impact of Askeskin Insurance Coverage on Average Utilization of Private 
Outpatient Healthcare per Household Member 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin -0.0030 0.0105 0.0039 0.0028 0.0011 
 [0.0082] [0.0112] [0.0106] [0.0115] [0.0121] 
Health card    -0.0058 -0.0038 
    [0.0131] [0.0131] 
Askes    0.0207 0.0179 
    [0.0194] [0.0195] 
Jamsostek    0.0103 0.0104 
    [0.0183] [0.0184] 
BLT recipient household     0.0095 
     [0.0097] 
Illness in last month   0.3710*** 0.3715*** 0.3685*** 
   [0.0126] [0.0127] [0.0127] 
Household size    0.0007 0.0006 
    [0.0041] [0.0041] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60) 
     
Share of females aged <6    0.0357 0.0384 
    [0.0604] [0.0605] 
Share of males aged <6    -0.0551 -0.0582 
    [0.0568] [0.0568] 
Share of females aged 6–17    0.0043 0.0012 
    [0.0485] [0.0484] 
Share of males aged 6–17    0.0289 0.0241 
    [0.0452] [0.0454] 
Share of females aged 18–60    0.0981** 0.0895** 
    [0.0422] [0.0423] 
Share of males aged >60    -0.0506 -0.0644 
    [0.0458] [0.0459] 
Share of females aged >60    0.1314*** 0.1296** 
    [0.0507] [0.0507] 
Female head of household    -0.0083 -0.0146 
    [0.0334] [0.0335] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education) 
     
No education    -0.0079 -0.0126 
    [0.0367] [0.0370] 
Primary school    -0.0193 -0.0223 
    [0.0358] [0.0361] 
Junior high school    -0.0309 -0.0342 
    [0.0353] [0.0356] 
Senior high school    -0.0249 -0.0308 
    [0.0324] [0.0328] 
Owns house    -0.0272* -0.0260* 
    [0.0144] [0.0144] 
Floor area (m2)    0.0000 0.0000 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Piped water access    0.0128 0.0150 
    [0.0135] [0.0135] 
Own water access    -0.0080 -0.0097 
    [0.0072] [0.0072] 
Constant    -0.0063 -0.0116 
    [0.0190] [0.0193] 
R-squared (within) 0.0003 0.0001 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Observations 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,448 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the number of outpatient visits at a private provider in last month. All 
specifications include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A8. Impact of Askeskin Insurance Coverage on Average Utilization of 
Outpatient Healthcare at a Public Health Center per Household Member 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin 0.0704*** 0.0293*** 0.0248*** 0.0328*** 0.0296*** 
 [0.0066] [0.0089] [0.0086] [0.0092] [0.0098] 
Health card    0.0297*** 0.0303*** 
    [0.0105] [0.0107] 
Askes    0.0161 0.0142 
    [0.0156] [0.0159] 
Jamsostek    -0.0066 -0.0064 
    [0.0147] [0.0150] 
BLT recipient household     0.0108 
     [0.0079] 
Illness in last month   0.2526*** 0.2516*** 0.2513*** 
   [0.0101] [0.0102] [0.0103] 
Household size    0.0023 0.0022 
    [0.0033] [0.0033] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60) 
     
Share of females aged <6    0.0275 0.0256 
    [0.0485] [0.0493] 
Share of males aged <6    -0.0243 -0.0262 
    [0.0456] [0.0463] 
Share of females aged 6–17    -0.0453 -0.0457 
    [0.0389] [0.0395] 
Share of males aged 6–17    -0.0187 -0.0179 
    [0.0362] [0.0370] 
Share of females aged 18–60    -0.0709** -0.0695** 
    [0.0338] [0.0345] 
Share of males aged >60    0.0678* 0.0668* 
    [0.0368] [0.0374] 
Share of females aged >60    -0.0965** -0.0970** 
    [0.0407] [0.0413] 
Female head of household    0.0119 0.0114 
    [0.0268] [0.0273] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education) 
     
No education    -0.0149 -0.0209 
    [0.0294] [0.0301] 
Primary school    -0.0114 -0.0185 
    [0.0287] [0.0294] 
Junior high school    -0.0099 -0.0165 
    [0.0283] [0.0290] 
Senior high school    0.0113 0.0064 
    [0.0260] [0.0267] 
Owns house    0.0199* 0.0196* 
    [0.0115] [0.0117] 
Floor area (m2)    -0.0001 -0.0001 
    [0.0000] [0.0001] 
Piped water access    0.0036 0.0039 
    [0.0108] [0.0110] 
Own water access    -0.0062 -0.0057 
    [0.0058] [0.0059] 
Constant    -0.0174 -0.0203 
    [0.0152] [0.0157] 
R-squared (within) 0.01 0.001 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Observations 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,448 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the number of outpatient visits at a public health center in last 
month. All specifications include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A9. Impact of Askeskin Insurance Coverage on Average Utilization of 
Outpatient Care at a Public Hospital per Household Member 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin 0.0011 0.0059 0.0055 0.0150** 0.0139* 
 [0.0047] [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0066] [0.0071] 
Health card    0.0290*** 0.0297*** 
    [0.0076] [0.0077] 
Askes    -0.0116 -0.0124 
    [0.0112] [0.0114] 
Jamsostek    -0.0032 -0.0046 
    [0.0106] [0.0108] 
BLT recipient household     0.0036 
     [0.0057] 
Illness in last month   0.0273*** 0.0256*** 0.0257*** 
   [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0074] 
Household size    -0.0047** -0.0046* 
    [0.0023] [0.0024] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60) 
     
Share of females aged <6    -0.0260 -0.0268 
    [0.0348] [0.0355] 
Share of males aged <6    -0.0393 -0.0398 
    [0.0328] [0.0333] 
Share of females aged 6–17    -0.0414 -0.0428 
    [0.0280] [0.0284] 
Share of males aged 6–17    -0.0141 -0.0151 
    [0.0261] [0.0266] 
Share of females aged 18–60    -0.0169 -0.0167 
    [0.0243] [0.0248] 
Share of males aged >60    0.0066 0.0039 
    [0.0264] [0.0269] 
Share of females aged >60    -0.0132 -0.0135 
    [0.0293] [0.0297] 
Female head of household    0.0125 0.0124 
    [0.0193] [0.0197] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education) 
     
No education    0.0039 0.0035 
    [0.0212] [0.0217] 
Primary school    0.0049 0.0043 
    [0.0206] [0.0212] 
Junior high school    -0.0106 -0.0113 
    [0.0203] [0.0209] 
Senior high school    0.0021 -0.0006 
    [0.0187] [0.0192] 
Owns house    -0.0157* -0.0152* 
    [0.0083] [0.0084] 
Floor area (m2)    0.0000 0.0000 
    [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Piped water access    -0.0020 -0.0013 
    [0.0078] [0.0079] 
Own water access    -0.0017 -0.0015 
    [0.0042] [0.0042] 
Constant    0.0265** 0.0269** 
    [0.0109] [0.0113] 
R-squared (within) 0.00001 0.0001 0.002 0.01 0.01 
Observations 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,582 8,448 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the number of outpatient visits at a public hospital in last month. All 
specifications include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Table A10. Impact of Askeskin Insurance Coverage on Households’ Out-Of-Pocket 
Health Spending Shares 
 Difference 2006 Difference-in-Difference 2005–2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Askeskin 0.0019 0.0013 0.0011 0.0030* 0.0034* 
 [0.0012] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0018] 
Health card    0.0048** 0.0046** 
    [0.0019] [0.0019] 
Askes    0.0029 0.0030 
    [0.0028] [0.0028] 
Jamsostek    -0.0015 -0.0017 
    [0.0026] [0.0027] 
BLT recipient household     -0.0013 
     [0.0014] 
Illness in last month   0.0159*** 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 
   [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] 
Household size    0.0015** 0.0015** 
    [0.0006] [0.0006] 
Household composition 
(ref: share of males aged 18–60) 
     
Share of females aged <6    0.0317*** 0.0320*** 
    [0.0087] [0.0088] 
Share of males aged <6    0.0384*** 0.0392*** 
    [0.0082] [0.0083] 
Share of females aged 6–17    0.0098 0.0100 
    [0.0070] [0.0071] 
Share of males aged 6–17    0.0085 0.0093 
    [0.0065] [0.0066] 
Share of females aged 18–60    0.0039 0.0044 
    [0.0061] [0.0062] 
Share of males aged >60    0.0148** 0.0149** 
    [0.0066] [0.0067] 
Share of females aged >60    0.0114 0.0118 
    [0.0073] [0.0074] 
Female head of household    0.0113** 0.0110** 
    [0.0048] [0.0049] 
Education of head of household 
(ref: Higher education) 
     
No education    -0.0047 -0.0048 
    [0.0053] [0.0054] 
Primary school    -0.0074 -0.0074 
    [0.0051] [0.0053] 
Junior high school    -0.0060 -0.0061 
    [0.0051] [0.0052] 
Senior high school    -0.0037 -0.0041 
    [0.0047] [0.0048] 
Owns house    -0.0021 -0.0022 
    [0.0021] [0.0021] 
Floor area (m2)    0.0000 0.0000 
    [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Piped water access    0.0033* 0.0032 
    [0.0019] [0.0020] 
Own water access    -0.0000 -0.0000 
    [0.0010] [0.0011] 
Constant    0.0020 0.0023 
    [0.0027] [0.0028] 
R-squared (within) 0.0003 0.0001 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Observations 8,581 8,581 8,581 8,581 8,447 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Outcome variable is the share of out-of-pocket health spending in monthly household 
expenditure. All specifications include province dummies. Balanced household panel. 
*10% Significance. 
**5% Significance. 
***1% Significance. 
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Figure A1. Distributions of per capita health expenditures in 2005 and 2006. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
 
 
Figure A2. Distributions of the propensity scores for treatment and control 
households. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Susenas 2005–2006 household panel. 
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